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Abstract:  
Throughout this article, we utilize consumption dominance curves, a tool developed 
by Makdissi and Wodon (2002) to analyze the impacts on poverty brought on by 
changes in the food subsidy system in Egypt. The Egypt Integrated Household 
Survey (EIHS) of  1997 allows us to conclude that changes brought to these 
subsidies have not always worked towards alleviating poverty. 
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 1 Introduction 
In 1997, the food subsidy program alone represented 5.6% of total government 
expenditures in Egypt. Numerous changes have been brought to this system to help alleviate 
budgetary pressure while maintaining affordable prices for primary food goods. In 2004-2005, 
the Egyptian government spent the equivalent of 2 billion US dollars on their food subsidy 
program (see Rasromani, 2006). This being said, the objective of the paper is to analyse the 
spending structure of Egyptian households to better understand whether these reforms were an 
adequate tool for fighting poverty.    
According to Santoro (2006), economic literature identifies three different approaches 
that can be used to analyze marginal tax reforms. The first type is based on the initial works by 
Ahmad and Stern (1984) who utilize a specific social welfare function. The second type of 
approach identifies avenues for tax reform based on the aversion to inequality and symmetry of 
the social welfare function. This approach is based on works by Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990), 
Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) and Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1996). The third and final approach 
considers that marginal tax reforms can be used as instruments for reducing poverty. It is based 
on works by Makdissi and Wodon (2002), Liberati (2003) and Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon 
(2006). The third approach will be utilized in this paper.  
The following section will present a brief methodological framework. The third section 
presents our analysis of the Egyptian data while utilizing this framwork. In closing, we present a 
brief conclusion and possibilities for future research.   
 
2 Methodological framework 
Let us suppose that the government wished to reduce an additive poverty index with an indirect 
tax reform. These types of indices have the following form:  
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where y is the equivalent income, z , the poverty line, F , the cumulative income distribution 
based on [  and  is a function which measures the share of total poverty belonging to a,0 ( zyp ,
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an individual with an income of y. Duclos and Makdissi (2004) utilize the properties of this 
function  which allows them to define classes of poverty indices . These classes are 
defined by 
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where Cs represents the set of continuous functions s differentiable on [ . When s=1, an 
increase in income of any one individual will reduce the poverty index. This class of indices is 
Paretian which means that all things being otherwise equal, the increase of any one individual’s 
income can not increase poverty. Moreover, these indices are symmetrical due to the fact that 
exchanging incomes between two individuals does not affect poverty. This type of income is said 
to satisfy the Pen principle (1971). The poverty indices included in 
]a,0
Π2 are also convex. This 
implies that they respect the Pigou Dalton principle which states that a transfer from one 
individual to a poorer individual will decrease poverty. Poverty indices belonging to Π3 in 
addition to the prior stated principles, respect the Kolm principle (1976) which states that a 
transfer taking place at the bottom of the distribution has a greater impact on poverty then one 
taking place higher in the distribution. Thus, a progressive transfer occurring in a low part of the 
distribution will reduce poverty even if it is accompanied by an equivalent regressive transfer 
higher in the distribution. Indices of this class with s greater then 3 can be interpreted ethically 
by using the generalized transfer principle proposed by Fishburn and Willig (1984). This 
principle states that greater the order s, greater is the sensibility of the index to transfers 
occurring in the lower part of the distribution. This principle implies that at the s=4 order, a pair 
of transfer combinations which satisfy the Kolm principle where one is progressive in the lower 
part of the distribution while another is regressive higher in the distribution will reduce poverty. 
Generalized higher-order transfer principles essentially postulate that, as s increases, the weight 
assigned to the impact of transfers occurring at the bottom of the distribution also increases. The 
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) indices are a particular example of additive poverty 
measures. Other examples of such indices are given by Chakravarty (1983) and Watts (1968). 
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Theses indices are in fact a particular case of the second class of poverty indices proposed by 
Clark, Hemming and Ulph (1981).  
 
2.1 Budgetary impact 
Let us assume that the economy consists of K consumption goods. The government 
wishes to reduce poverty by marginally increasing the subsidy on good i and finance this 
increase by augmenting marginally the tax (or marginally reduce subsidy) on good j. This reform 
is therefore implemented within a balanced budget. Let us denote R to indicate the total income 
incurred by the indirect tax reform. If the population is comprised of I individuals, we have: 
,
1
∑
=
=
K
k
kk XtIR  (3) 
where Xk represents the average consumption of the good k and tk, the tax imposed on good k 
when or the subsidy if . The impact of the marginal reform on total income is 
therefore:  
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Seeing how this reform is constrained by a balanced budget, we can write that dR = 0. 
Integrating this into the equation (4) produces the following:  
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Wildasin (1984) describes γ  as the differential of the efficiency cost  of obtaining one 
dollar (or any other currency) of public funds by taxing good j to subsidize good i. Yitzhaki and 
Thirsk (1990) and Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) argue that if γ  is superior to one, it is 
impossible to have a second order dominant reform due to the increasing loss incurred by the 
reform. However, seeing how we are in a poverty analysis perspective, it is possible to have a 
reform that is dominant at all orders of stochastic dominance with a γ  parameter superior to one 
if the loss cost is supported by the non poor. 
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2.2 Impacts on poverty 
The impact a marginal change of fiscal reform will have on an individual’s share of poverty with 
an income equal to y is  
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Besley and Kanbur (1988) show that by using Roy’s identity and the current price vector as the 
vector or reference prices, the change in equivalent income produced by a marginal change of tax 
on good k results in  
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where xk ( )y  is the Marshalian demand of good k with the current price vector. 
Introducing equations (5) and (7) into equation (6), we obtain 
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To obtain the reform’s impact on poverty, we integrate equation (8): 
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Knowing that  for all income levels (see equation (2)); when xi ( )y /Xi is greater at 
all points than
( ) 0/, ≤∂∂ yzyp
( )jj Xx /γ , there is an unequivocal reduction of poverty. Basing their argument on 
this premise, Makdissi and Wodon (2002) develop a method which allows for stochastic 
dominance test to be conducted on indirect tax reforms. They define consumption dominance as 
follows4 : 
 
                                                 
4 Multiplying by f ( )y  at the first order was introduced by Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2006) to implement  
empirically Kernel estimations into consumption dominance curves of ordre 1 which wont be used in this paper. 
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In their article, they present a result that can in the context of this paper be written as:  
A marginal reform, carried out in a balanced budget framework by marginally increasing 
the subsidy of good i and marginally increasing the tax on good j will reduce poverty for 
all indices where sP Π∈ and all poverty lines where [ ]+∈ zz ,0  if and only if 
( ) ( ) [ ].z0,y   0 +∈∀≥− yCDyCD sjsi γ   (11) 
2.3 Critical poverty line 
If stochastic dominance tests fail at a certain order of dominance, the analyst must choose 
between two alternatives. First, he may restrain the range of admissible poverty indices by 
increasing the order of stochastic dominance. Second, he could restrain the maximum poverty 
line to z+. A way of limiting the maximum poverty line is to find the critical poverty line ( )γsz  
associated to order s and to one value of the economic efficiency parameter,γ . This value of 
 is the maximum poverty line at which this specific stochastic dominance test is valid. The 
maximum poverty line is situated at the first intersection between both curves and is formally 
defined as:  
( )γsz
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]{ }zyyCDyCDzz sjsis ,0  0  sup ∈∀≥−= γγ .  (12) 
2.4 Critical efficiency parameter 
Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2006) also introduce the concept of critical efficiency 
parameters when the value of γ  is uncertain. If the condition of equation (11) is satisfied at a 
certain order of dominance and at a certain value of 0γ , it becomes obvious that this will satisfy 
the equation for all parameter values inferior to 0γ . This being said, it is possible to define a 
critical value ( )+zsγ  associated to the maximum poverty line, z+. This critical value γ  occurs 
when  and  intersect at the maximum poverty line siCD
s
jCDγ z+. This is defined mathematically 
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by 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]{ }++ ∈∀≥−= zyyCDyCDz sjsis ,0  0  sup γγγ . (13) 
 
 
 
3 Analysis of reforms brought to the food subsidy program 
To help alleviate budgetary pressure, the Egyptian government is seeking ways to reduce 
spending on subsidy programs while maintaining affordable prices for primary food goods for 
the poor. The objective of this section is not to suggest solutions for the reduction of public 
spending but to analyze whether the reforms that have undergone the food subsidy program are 
coherent in a poverty alleviation framework. To do this, we have used the Egypt Integrated 
Household Survey (EIHS) for 19975. 
 
3.1 Description of the food subsidy program6 
It is interesting to note that in 1997, the year of the EIHS survey, the basket of subsidized 
goods had not yet been affected by the reforms. At the time of the survey, sugar, cooking oil, 
wheat and bread are subsidized goods. Today, the Egyptian government now subsidizes sugar, 
cooking oil, macaroni, lentils and beans. These changes were made with the idea of reducing the 
financial burden of the subsidy program while providing the poor with basic food goods at 
affordable prices. It therefore becomes appropriate to use this dataset to analyze in retrospect the 
desirability of the reform and analyze the impact on poverty7.  
 The food subsidy program operates on the basis of ration cards. To have access to a 
monthly quota of subsidized sugar and cooking oil, an individual must have a ration card. There 
exist two types of ration card: green and red. The green cards offer a higher rate of subsidy then 
red cards. The idea behind the two cards system is to allow better targeting of the poor 
                                                 
5 There exists a micro data survey for 1999 but this survey was only done on a sub sample of the 1997 survey.  
Moreover, it does not contain all the information required for our analysis. The data was obtained through the 
intermediary of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).  
6 Gutner (1999) presents an overview of this reform all while presenting its advantages and inconveniences. Ahmed,  
Bouis, Gutner and Löfgren (2001) present a revue of all the works that have been done on the analyses of Egyptian 
subsides. Here, the reader can find a more detailed description of this system and its reforms it has undergone.  
7 It has come to our attention that while this article was being written, the Egyptian government modified the food 
subsidy program’s list of subsidized goods to exclude beans and lentils. As of now, sugar, oil, tea and rice make up 
the list of subsidized food goods.   
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population. Ahmed and Bouis (2002) show that an important proportion of rich Egyptians hold 
green cards while certain poor have none. On average, 72% of the population holds a green card 
while 10% hold a red card. This distribution remains relatively unchanged regardless of income 
level. In a recent study by the United Nations World Food Program, experts estimate that 7 
million of the poor in Egypt do not have access to the subsidized food program (WTP/MOSIT, 
2005).  The Egyptian government is currently attempting to make the distribution of cards more 
equitable.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
In this paper, total household per capita expenditure is used as a proxy for individual permanent 
income. This variable is therefore constructed by adding all food and non food expenditures, non 
durable good expenditures, and the depreciation values of durable goods as well as the rental 
value for dwelling expenditures8. In regards to dwelling expenditures, to better compare 
households where individuals are owners with those who are tenants, a hedonic regression of 
rent was used to impute a value for dwelling expenditures for those who own their dwelling. As 
Datt, Jolliffe and Sharma (1998) have done, we derived this value by regressing dwelling 
characteristics on rent paid by tenants and then using the estimates on those who own their 
dwelling to identify an estimated rental value. Table 6 of the appendix presents the results of this 
regression. It shows that households living in urban areas pay higher rent then those living in 
rural areas. Moreover, the capital, Cairo is shown to be the area where rent is greatest, followed 
by the district of Menya. Northern districts, in particular, Alexandria and Damietta are those with 
the lowest rent when compared to the capital. In regards to household characteristics, the greater 
the number of rooms, quality of walls, floors and roofs materials directly translates into higher 
rent prices.   
We proceed by normalizing total household expenditures by a poverty line of 129.19 Egyptian 
pounds per month. As a result, an individual with a level of normalized total expenditures equal 
to 1 has a total expenditure equal to the poverty line. When the level of normalized total 
expenditures is equal to 0.5 or 2, the household is situated at 50% and 200% of the poverty line 
respectively.  This normalization renders tables easier to interpret.  
Table 1 presents the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) class of poverty indices ,  and  0P 1P 2P
                                                 
8 Refer to appendix 2 of the paper by Datt, Jolliffe et Sharma (1998) for more details. 
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for Egypt and its five regions.  
 
Table 1 : Poverty levels by region (%) 
  P0 P1 P2 
Metropolitan  
30.38 
(4.38) 
8.52 
(1.66) 
3.51 
(0.86) 
Urban Lower-
Egypte (North) 
25.46 
(4.07) 
6.27 
(1.17) 
2.27 
(0.50) 
Rural High-
Egypte (North) 
27.50 
(2.55) 
7.17 
(1.19) 
2.86 
(0.68) 
Urban High-
Egypte (South) 
18.32 
(3.70) 
4.55 
(1.24) 
1.74 
(0.61) 
Rural High-
Egypte (South) 
35.36 
(3.23) 
9.06 
(1.09) 
3.54 
(0.54) 
National 
28.02 
(1.62) 
7.32 
(0.60) 
2.89 
(0.31) 
Source: EIHS 1997, author’s calculations. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. 
 
Thus, 28.02% of Egyptian households are considered as poor. Both the capital and the rural 
southern region have the greatest incidence of poverty, 30.38% and 35.36% respectively. The 
incidence of poverty in other regions are inferior possibly due among other factors to the 
governments resolve to develop these areas. Also, the northern and southern urban areas, 
followed by the northern rural area are shown to have the lowest levels of incidence. Similar 
results were found for the depth and severity of poverty9.  
 
3.3 Analysis of changes brought to the subsidy program 
Let us now analyze the various changes the Egyptian government has brought to the list of 
subsidized goods. To accomplish this, we compare the CD curves of the newly subsidized goods 
and compare it with goods that are no longer subsidized and then verify if the reform evolves as 
predicted in our methodology.  
 
                                                 
9 For a detailed povery profile, see Datt, Jolliffe and Sharma (1998). 
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Table 2 : Comparison « macaroni » and « tamwin bread » 
Indirect taxation " Macaroni " against " Tamwin Bread" , Egypt 1997 
Critical efficiency ratio “Gamma” for various poverty lines (Z+) 
  z+ = 1 z+ = 2 
gamma2 z+ 1.23 1.04 
gamma3 z+ 1.49 1.13 
Critical poverty lines “Z GAMMA” for various efficiency parameters 
“gamma” 
  gamma = 1 gamma = 1.5 
 z2 gamma 2.57 0.5 
 z3 gamma - 1 
             Source: EIHS 1997 author’s tabulation 
 
In Table 2 we present the results of the comparison between “macaroni” and “tamwin 
bread”. These results suggest that it would be appropriate to tax macaroni to then increase 
subsidies on tamwin bread.  Therefore, this modification to the list of subsidized food goods was 
not desirable even though the efficiency cost of taxing macaroni is 23% larger then that of 
tamwin bread. The increase of tax on macaroni would allow for an increased subsidy on tamwin 
bread which would result in a reduction of all poverty indices belonging to  and all poverty 
lines equal or inferior to the official poverty line. This result also holds true for all poverty lines 
inferior or equal to two times the official poverty line if the efficiency cost  of taxing macaroni is 
4% greater then that of taxing tamwin bread. In fact, if the efficiency costs of taxing both goods 
are equal, we can consider all poverty lines inferior to 2.57 times the official line. It is important 
to note that this class of indices includes all indices that are Paretian, symmetrical and respect the 
Pigou-Dalton aversion to inequality. These three principles are generally accepted by a large 
majority of analysts’, therefore our results are valid for a wide range of indices. If we wish to 
consider indices belonging to the class, the results are even more convincing. Even if we 
were to consider that the efficiency cost of taxing macaroni is 49% superior to that of taxing 
tamwin bread, an increase in the taxation of macaroni which in turn would subsidize tamwin 
bread would reduce poverty for all indices belonging to the 
2Π
3Π
3Π  class and also for all poverty 
lines inferior or equal to the official poverty line. This result also holds true for all poverty lines 
equal to two times the official poverty line if the efficiency cost of taxing macaroni is 13% 
superior to that of taxing tamwin bread. In effect, if the efficiency costs of taxing both goods 
were equal, we can consider for this class of indices every imaginable poverty line up to the 
maximum income of a seeing how both curves never intersect.  
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Table 3 : Comparison « beans (kid) » and « tamwin bread » 
Indirect taxation " Beans (kid) " against " Tamwin Bread" , Egypt 1997 
Critical efficiency ratio “Gamma” for various poverty lines (Z+) 
  z+ = 1 z+ = 2 
gamma2 z+ 1.62 1.07 
gamma3 z+ 2.03 1.22 
Critical poverty lines “Z GAMMA” for various efficiency parameters 
“gamma” 
  gamma = 1 gamma = 1.5 
 z2 gamma - 1.06 
 z3 gamma - 1.33 
             Source: EIHS 1997 author’s tabulation 
 
Table 4 : Comparison «other beans » and « tamwin bread » 
Indirect taxation " other beans " against "Tamwin bread" , Égypte 1997 
Critical efficiency ratio “Gamma” for various poverty lines (Z+) 
  z+ = 1 z+ = 2 
gamma2 z+ 2.88 1.25 
gamma3 z+ 5.87 1.81 
Critical poverty lines “Z GAMMA” for various efficiency parameters 
“gamma” 
  gamma = 1 gamma = 1.5 
 z2 gamma - 1.63 
 z3 gamma - 2.59 
             Source: EIHS 1997 author’s tabulation 
 
In Table 3 and Table 4, we present the results from the comparison of “beans” and “tamwin 
bread”. These results suggest that it would be appropriate to tax beans to in turn subsidize 
tamwin bread. This change in the list of subsidized food goods is once again not a desirable 
choice since even if the efficiency cost of taxing “kid” beans (resp. other beans) is 62% (resp. 
188%) superior to that of taxing tamwin bread, an increase of taxes on beans which would allow 
for an increase in subsidy of tamwin bread would reduce poverty for all indices belonging to the 
 class and for all poverty lines equal or inferior to the official poverty line. These results hold 
true for all poverty lines inferior or equal to two times the official poverty line if the efficiency 
cost of taxing “kid” beans (resp. other beans) is 7 % (resp. 25%) superior to that of taxing 
tamwin bread. In fact, if the efficiency costs of taxing both goods were equal, we could consider 
all poverty lines imaginable up to the maximum income a seeing how both curves never intersect 
for both types of beans. Now, if we consider only indices belonging to the  class, the results 
once again are very convincing. Even with efficiency cost of taxing beans is 103% (resp. 487%) 
greater then that of bread, an increase of taxes on beans to subsidize tamwin bread would result 
2Π
3Π
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in a reduction of poverty for all poverty indices belonging to the 3Π  class and for all poverty 
lines equal or inferior to the official line. This result remains true for all poverty lines inferior or 
equal to two times the official poverty line if the efficiency cost of taxing beans is 22% (resp. 
81%) greater the taxing tamwin bread. 
Table 5 presents the results of the comparison between “tamwin flour” and “lentils”. 
Table 5 : Comparison « tamwin flour » and « lentils » 
Indirect taxation " Tamwin flour "  against  " Lentils " , Egypt 1997 
Critical efficiency ratio “Gamma” for various poverty lines (Z+) 
  z+ = 1 z+ = 2 
gamma2 z+ 1.18 1.01 
gamma3 z+ 1.26 1.08 
Critical poverty lines “Z GAMMA” for various efficiency parameters 
“gamma” 
  gamma = 1 gamma = 1.5 
 z2 gamma 2.37 0.69 
 z3 gamma - 0.81 
             Source: EIHS 1997author’s tabulation 
 
These results suggest that is would be appropriate to tax flour to in turn increase subsidies on 
lentils. This indicates that replacing tamwin flour with lentils in the list of subsidized food goods 
was a desirable decision if the objective was to reduce poverty. We note that even if the 
efficiency cost of taxing flour was 18% greater then that of taxing lentils, a reduction of 
subsidies on tamwin flour to increase subsidies on lentils would reduce poverty for any poverty 
indices belonging to the  class and for all poverty lines inferior or equal to the official poverty 
line. The results hold true for all the poverty lines inferior or equal to two times the official 
poverty line if the efficiency cost of taxing lentils is 1% greater then that of tamwin flour. In fact, 
all poverty lines inferior to 2.37 times the official poverty line can be considered if both cost 
efficiencies are equal. If we now consider indices belonging to the 
2Π
3Π  class, the results are once 
again very convincing. Even if the efficiency cost of taxing tamwin flour is 26% greater then that 
of lentils; a reduction of subsidies designated to flour diverted towards lentils would reduce 
poverty for all poverty indices belonging to the 3Π class and for all poverty lines equal or 
inferior to the official poverty line. This remains true for all poverty lines inferior or equal to two 
times the official poverty line if the efficiency cost of taxing tamwin flour is 8% greater then that 
of taxing lentils. 
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Looking at these results, we conclude that the Egyptian government should have kept tamwin 
bread on the list of subsidized goods and should not have added beans and macaroni if it wished 
to alleviate poverty.  However, replacing subsidies on tamwin flour by subsidies on lentils is a 
coherent policy in regards to poverty alleviation.  
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 In this article, we have analyzed the impact specific poverty food subsidy reforms that 
Egypt have had. We conclude that the changes brought to the list of subsidized food goods have 
not always been relevant as a tool for fighting poverty. It would be interesting in future works to 
study the entirety of the Egyptian price system paying attention to both general indirect taxes as 
well as regulated infrastructure prices. To do this, we could use methodologies proposed by 
Makdissi and Wodon (2005) who adapt the analysis of CD curves to the analysis of 
infrastructure sectors. It would also be interesting to study the targeting and allocation properties 
of current Egyptian poverty reduction policies with such tools as those developed by Duclos, 
Makdissi and Wodon (2005) who also adapt CD curves to this end.  
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Appendix 
Table 6 : Hedonic regression of rent for Egyptian Households 
Dependant variable : log of rent 
Variables Coefficients (Standard error) 
Urban 0.302** (0.038) 
Alexandria -0.617** (0.108) 
Suez -0.318*   (0.173) 
Damietta -0.626** (0.110) 
Dakhalia -0.043     (0.090) 
Sharbia -0.266** (0.091) 
Kalyubia -0.082     (0.082) 
Kuer -0.386** (0.109) 
Gharbia -0.358** (0.088) 
El Menuf -0.146     (0.098) 
Behera -0.657** (0.102) 
Ismailia -0.203*   (0.122) 
Giza -0.001     (0.079) 
Benisuef 0.244*   (0.118) 
Fayoum -0.396** (0.095) 
Menya -0.197** (0.087) 
Assiut -0.261** (0.093) 
Souhag -0.469** (0.093) 
Qena 0.035     (0.096) 
Government 
districts 
(Ref :Cairo) 
Aswan -0.192    (0.162) 
Number of rooms 0.151** (0.009) 
Joined stone earth  -0.253** (0.060) 
Wood/Branches -1.274*   (0.606) 
Cement   0.002      (0.042) 
Blanco -0.415** (0.056) 
Material of 
exterior wall 
(ref : cement 
joined stone) 
Others (Steel,…) -0.304   (0.429) 
Wood  0.319*   0.186) 
Brick/Stone 0.167   (0.117) 
Cement/Tiles 0.284** (0.041) 
Material of 
floor (ref : 
earth) 
Others 0.537** (0.132) 
Earth 0.078     (0.189) 
Wood/Branches 0.204** (0.061) 
Galvanized steel 0.595** (0.192) 
Cement   0.497** (0.066) 
Tiles/Slate 0.082     (0.126) 
Material of 
roofing (réf : 
straw) 
Others 0.012     (0.107) 
Constant 3.069** (0.097) 
Number of Observations : 1716 
R-squared : 0.5107 ;  Adjusted R-square : 0.5002 
(*) This table presents the estimated parameters of the regression.  Parameters 
with not star are not statistically significant; those with one star are significant at 
the level of 10% and those with two stars are significant at the 5% level. Standard 
errors are show in parentheses. 
Source: EIHS 1997, author’s tabulations 
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